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Economic research overwhelmingly shows that the utility individuals derive from 
their income depends on the incomes of others. Theoretical literature has proven 
that  these  status  effects imply a more egalitarian income  policy  than in the 
conventional case, in which people value their income independently from the 
income of others. This article qualifies this conclusion in three ways. First, this 
policy implication holds if low income groups are sensitive to status, but not if 
high income groups are predominantly so. Neither do status effects provide an 
economic rational for egalitarian income policy if they only pertain to peer groups 
with similar income levels. Third, if status effects are grounded in vices like envy, 
jealousy, grudgingness or spite, a moral basis for egalitarian income policy is 
lacking, because distributive justice cannot be based on perverse preferences. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Adam Smith argued in the Wealth of Nations that standards of decency are socially 
determined: ‘the Greeks and Romans lived…. very comfortably though they had no 
linen’ but ‘in the present time, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-
laborer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt’ (Smith, 1776: 
541).  In standard economic theory, consumers are assumed to care only about 
absolute levels of income or consumption. However, there is considerable empirical 
evidence that supports Smith’s ideas and shows that relative income and consumption 
are important determinants of individual well-being and behavior. One of the earliest 
researches of Easterlin (1974) in this research field indicated that only relative income 
matters to individuals. More recent research indicates a less extreme position in which 
utility depends on both absolute and relative income (Alessie and Kapteyn, 1991; 
Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; Alpizar et al 2005; Carlsson et al, 2007).  
  Relative income concerns imply that an increase in income of an individual 
imposes negative externalities on the well-being of others. Therefore, this finding 
suggests that government should intervene to reduce over-consumption (Layard, 
2003; Graafland, 2007). More specifically, literature on optimal taxation has shown 
that  concerns for relative positions imply  higher marginal tax rates and income 
redistribution from wealthy to poor citizens (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Oswald, 
1983; Blomquist, 1993; Persson, 1995; Ireland, 2001; Wendner, 2003; Wendner and 
Goulder, 2008; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Samano, 2009; Wendner, 
2010).  
  In this paper I develop, however, three arguments that restrict the potential of 
the policy implication of previous literature. The first argument is derived by taking 
into account that status effects may be different for high and low income groups. 
Using a simple model that derives optimal distribution for two types of individuals, I 
find that status effects only give rise to redistribution if the low income groups exhibit 
status effects. If status effects mainly pertain to high income groups, they present no 
or less reason for redistribution. The second argument is derived by introducing peer 
group reference income levels. I show that if reference income levels are only related 
to peer groups with similar income levels, no redistribution from rich to poor income 
groups is implied. The third type of argument against redistribution based on status 
effects is more philosophical in nature. This argument acknowledges that status 
effects may be rooted in morally dubious sentiments like envy, jealousy, grudgingness 
or spite. This kind of preferences provides no morally valid reason for redistribution. 
  The contents of this paper are as follows. Section 2 gives a short introduction 
into social theories of status effects and recent empirical research. In section 3, I will 
investigate the implications of divergent status effects for income distribution for two 
boundary situations: maximin and utilitarianism, assuming that reference levels of 
income  are related to average income.  In section 4,  I  will  introduce  relative 
preferences  that are related to peer group income levels and  re-analyse the   2 
implications  for income policy.  Section  5  provides  the  moral argument against 
correcting income distribution because of status effects. Section 6 summarizes the 
main conclusions. 
 
2.  Relative income preferences: social theory and empirical evidence 
 
The notion that individuals judge the adequacy of their income by a socially 
determined standard has been voiced by several social theorists. 
A well-known account of status goods is given by Thorstein Veblen in his 
1899 classic The Theory of the Leisure Class. He argues that consumption is mainly 
important not for the intrinsic functionality of products to satisfy material needs, but 
for its social symbolism. Members of a certain social class secure their status by 
making their wealth visible. They signal their status by luxury goods. Wealth or 
power must be put in evidence, for esteem is awarded only on evidence (Schor, 1997).  
Another philosopher that has stressed the social context of the satisfaction 
from the consumption of goods  or services  is  René Girard  (1961). According to 
Girard, individuals want certain goods or services only because other people want 
these goods or services. The value an individual attaches to a certain good is derived 
from the value he or she supposes other people attach to this good. He calls this type 
of desire ‘mimetic’, because individuals copy the wants of other individuals. Mimesis 
is a central human characteristic that enables individuals to learn from other persons.  
  The idea of the relative value of consumption because of social interaction has 
also been strongly put forward by Fred Hirsch (1977). Hirsch distinguishes between 
private goods (Hirsch calls them material goods) and goods that confer status, which 
he calls ‘positional goods’. The satisfaction from the consumption of private goods is 
independent  of  the consumption of material goods by others. For example, to a 
hungry man, the satisfaction derived from a square meal is unaffected by the meals 
other people eat, or if he is hungry enough, by anything else they do. His meal is an 
entirely individual affair. In technical terms, it is a pure private good. Positional goods 
are, in contrast, subject to social scarcity. The satisfaction from a positional good is 
derived from its relative position alone. Hirsch distinguishes between various types of 
social scarcity. First, social scarcity may be caused by absolute physical scarcities. 
Thus, part of the attraction of a Rembrandt or exclusive access to a particular natural 
landscape, is derived from being the only one of its kind. A second type of consumer 
scarcity is social. This concerns consumer goods that are limited in absolute supply 
not by physical, but by social factors. The sole source of satisfaction is derived from 
the symbol rather than the substance: the utility derived from the good diminishes by 
the existence of good copies. A third type of social scarcity concerns goods that 
generate satisfaction independent of the satisfaction enjoyed by others, but are yet 
influenced by the consumption or activities of others, for example, by congestion. 
Congestion is not limited to mutual impediment in physical form, as in traffic   3 
congestion, but can also arise in purely social relationships like leadership positions. 
Only one person can be the leader in an organization.  
  The distinguishing characteristic of these positional goods is not, of course, 
scarcity as such: private goods are also scarce in the sense of being attainable only 
through the sacrifice or displacement of other satisfactions. But this regular economic 
scarcity will diminish over time if these types of goods become increasingly available 
through growth in production. In contrast, the scarcity of positional goods is 
permanent. The possession of these goods constitutes what can be called ‘oligarchic’ 
wealth which is possible for the few, but never –  whatever the level of average 
productivity - for all.  
 
Recent empirical research has  abundantly  confirmed the importance of relative 
income preferences (Brekke and Howarth, 2002).
1 A well-known research is the one 
by Solnick and Hemenway (1998), who asked respondents whether they would prefer 
to be a poor but relatively rich person in a poor society or a rich but relatively poor 
person in a rich society.
2
  A similar study was done by Johansson-Stenman et al (2002). They used an 
experiment where Swedish students made a choice between a society where an 
imaginary grandchild’s income would  be higher than  average income and,  on the 
other side, a society where the grandchild would  earn less than average  income. 
Unlike Solnick and Hemenway (1998), they used several pair wise choices enabling 
them to calculate the degree of positionality for each individual. Again it was found 
that most people care about relative income.  
 In this study, roughly 50 per cent of the respondents chose 
each option. Assuming that respondents seek to maximize a utility function u = (1-b) 
ln (y) + b ln (y/yav), where y denotes one’s own net income and yav the average net 
income level, the parameter  b  would be equal to 1/3. The study by  Solnick and 
Hemenway also reveals that positional competition is more important for certain types 
of goods and services than for other types of variables. Positional considerations were, 
for example, important for physical attractiveness and education, but relatively 
unimportant for vacation time. People consistently favored a larger number of days 
off from work, suggesting that the enjoyment of leisure is comparatively free from 
status considerations.  
  A  third  example is Alpizar et al (2005). Using a ratio comparison utility 
function, they estimate that the mean degree of positionality is 0.45. This means that 
45% of the utility increase from a small income increase arises from enjoying a higher 
                                                 
1 Cole et al. (1992) argue that there may also be other underlying preferences that are fundamentally 
individualistic and may explain the type of interdependencies created by status goods. For example, 
one could argue that people want a high status, because a high status enables one to obtain more private 
consumption. Thus, status goods would not be a goal and an argument in the utility function, but rather 
be a means to obtain private consumption. People with a high status get the best jobs and, thus, earn the 
highest income. 
2 Earlier, empirical evidence for the importance of relative payoffs was also provided by Agell and 
Lundborg (1995) and Bewley (1998) and Clark and Oswald (1996).   4 
relative income. This fraction strikes a balance between the two extreme hypotheses 
that only relative income matters and, on the other side, that only absolute income 
matters. They repeat their experiment for different types of consumption (instead of 
income). Then they find that the degree of positionality is between 0.5 and 0.75 for 
visible goods like cars and housing, while lower than 0.25 for less visible goods like 
insurance and vacation, confirming that there are differences in the degree of 
positionality among different types of goods. Similar results were found by Carlsson 
et al (2007). 
  Another interesting survey is the one by Lehman (2001), who estimates the 
importance of relative pay-offs in a competitive business situation. Individuals were 
asked to report satisfaction with the results of a sales competition between two stores 
in the same market for various combinations of sales. The results show considerable 
emphasis on relative pay-offs: the satisfaction from their relative sales was about 9 
times larger than the satisfaction from their sales in absolute numbers. The results also 
show some evidence of decreasing marginal impact and asymmetry. Doing worse 
than the opponent is somewhat more distasteful than doing better by the same amount. 
Furthermore, Lehman (2001) found evidence that pay-off changes were especially 
important when pay-offs were close to equal. For example, a sales gain of US $ 4 
million was worth only 5.2 units of satisfaction if the change was from US$ 2 to 6 
million with a corresponding decline in the competitor’s sales from US$ 18 to 14 
million. However, a US$ 3 million change from 12 to 15 and a corresponding decline 
in the competitor’s sales from 15 to 12 million produced a much larger increase in 
satisfaction of 26.7.  
   
3  Reference to average income  
 
The empirical research described in section 2 indicates that status has a major impact 
on choice behavior of individuals. In the next sections, I will research the implications 
of this kind of relative concerns for income distribution.  In contrast to other 
literature
3
  Since I am not so much interested in the details of the implications for tax 
structure or public good provision, I will develop a rather simple economic model that 
derives optimality forms of redistributive transfers from a  better-off to a  less-off 
person that suffice for the purpose at hand: that is, to show that status effects do not 
always imply egalitarian income policy. In this model, I will distinguish between two 
motives. On the one hand, it is assumed that the satisfaction that persons get from 
their income is partly related to their individual absolute level of income and partly to 
their relative income. On the other hand, it is assumed that reducing inequality by a 
, I distinguish two models with alternative decision rules, the maximin rule 
and the utility maximization rule.  
                                                 
3  Except  Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) who also analyse both maximin and a utilitarian social 
objective.    5 
transfer from the better-off to the less-off may elicit negative utility effects, for 
example, because of disincentive effects on the economic effort of both groups that 
reduce their incomes.  
  Following Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008), I assume that there are 
just two groups of persons in society that are equal in numbers, the high-ability (i.e. 
the rich) type (r) and the low-ability (i.e. the poor)  type  (p). Ex-ante (without 
redistribution), each individual earns a certain income, Yr respectively Yp (with Yp = Q 
Yr and Q < 1, reflecting the productivity differential). A transfer redistributes income 
from the rich to the poor.  




   
(1a)   ui = v(Ni
  – αi N)  ;  i= r,p; 0 < αi <1; v’>0; v’’< 0    
(1b)   N = (Nr + Np) / 2
   
               
 
Ni denotes the net income, N average net income and αi the degree of positionality.
5 
Equation (1) diverts from most other models in one crucial aspect. In particular, 
whereas Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983), Wendner and Goulder (2008), 
Samano (2009) and Wendner (2010) all assume that the degree of positionality is 
homogeneous  across all income groups, equation (1) allows different degrees of 
positionality for the rich and for the poor. A similar assumption is made by Aronsson 
and Johansson-Stenman (2008).
6
  There is apriori no reason to assume that αp > αr or the other way around, 
because there may be opposite forces at work. One could, for example, argue that if 
people get richer, their need for status slowly weakens and is replaced by a need for 
self actualization (as stressed by the needs hierarchy of Maslow (1943)). But one can 
also argue the opposite by noting that the rich have become rich just because they 
were initially more sensitive to status which stimulated them to develop and gain 
financial success. Another reason for assuming that the rich are more sensitive to 
status is that luxury goods are more subject to positional competition than goods that 
meet basic needs. Since the budget share spent on positional goods will be higher for 
rich than for poor income groups, they will also be confronted with more positional 
competition. An empirical indication for this asymmetry is that in rich countries 
 
                                                 
4 Lower cases denote functions, capitals denote variables, and Greek letters parameters. 
5  Equation (1a) assumes an additive impact of relative preferences. An alternative is the ratio 
comparison utility function (i.e. ui = v(Ni N
-α)) (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978) or a combination of 
difference and ratio comparisons (Dupor and Liu, 2003). Since there are little empirical indications that 
the ratio formulation performs better in terms of explaining economic behavior (Alpizar et al, 2005) 
and since the ratio formulation does not yield qualitatively different results, we use the (simpler) 
additive formulation. 
6 Also Wendner (2003) allows diversity in the degree of positionality in his intergenerational model, 
but these differences only apply to the degree of positionality of different generations and not for 
different income groups.    6 
happiness depends more on relative incomes than in poor countries (Oswald, 1997). 
v’’< 0 reflects the standard assumption of decreasing marginal return from income. 
This is indicated by the empirical evidence of Lehman (2001) presented above that 
doing worse than the opponent is somewhat more distasteful than doing better by the 
same amount.  
  The net incomes of the rich and the poor are defined by, respectively, 
 
(2a)  Nr = Yr (1–T–gr (T)) 
(2b)  Np = Q Yr (1+T/Q–gp (T/Q)) 
 
T denotes the transfer rate, i.e. the transfer that the rich pay to the poor as a ratio of Yr. 
Yi denotes the incomes of the rich and the poor respectively if the transfer is absent. 
The function g denotes indirect harmful effects of the transfer on utility which are 
assumed to be related to income.
7
   
  We assume that these indirect  effects are 
marginally increasing (g’’>0).  
3.1.  Maximin 
 
The optimal distribution depends on the decision rule that the government will apply. 
If the government applies a maximin decision rule, the transfer should be set so high 
that the utility of the least advantaged (up) be maximized. The first order condition 
then gives: 
 
(3a)   (1 – gp’) (1 – 0.5αp)




(3b)   (1 – gp’)+ 0.5 αp
 (gp’ + gr’) = 0 
 
Equation (3a) shows that the transfer generates various types of benefits and costs for 
the poor. The first term (1) expresses the utility of the poor from the increase in 
income from the transfer. The second term (– gp’) expresses the indirect costs of the 
transfer on the income of the poor. The third term (1– 0.5αp) shows that the impact of 
the direct and indirect income effects on the utility of the poor is eroded by relative 
income preferences, because the reference income  (the average income) depends 
                                                 
7 The indirect effects consist of, for example, the inefficiency costs caused by the disincentive effects 
that the transfer has on the incomes of the rich and the poor, the costs of administrative systems as well 
as (the monetary equivalent of) negative feelings because of the lack of desert as the transfer is paid or 
earned with no performance in return.   7 
partly on the income of the poor. The fourth term ((1 + gr’) 0.5 αr) shows that relative 
income preferences increase the positive impact of the transfer on the utility of the 
poor by lowering the net income of the rich, both through the direct and indirect 
effects of the transfer on the net income of the rich.  
  Equation (3a) can be simplified to equation (3b) by noting that the status 
effects caused by the transfer’s direct impact on income on the rich and the poor’s 
incomes counterbalance. By taking the total differential of equation (3b), the impact 
of αp on T can be derived as: 
 
(4)  (2 gp’’ – αp (gp’’+ gr’’)) ∆T = ( gp’ + gr’)  ∆ αp 
 
The right hand side of equation (4) shows that there are basically two reasons why the 
transfer should be set higher if status becomes more important. First, a rise in αp 
reduces the decline in the poor’s utility caused by the indirect effect on the poor’s 
income that results from the transfer. The second effect is that a higher status effect 
increases the poor’s utility from the fall in income of the rich induced by the indirect 
effects that the transfer causes on the rich’s income. The sum of both effects  is 
expressed by the term (gp’ + gr’) in the right hand side of equation (4) and explains 
why a rise in αp increases the optimal transfer rate 
  The  term between brackets on the left hand side of equation (4) gives an 
expression of the second order condition for maximal utility. The first term (2 gp’’) 
expresses the negative second order effect of an increase in transfer on the poor’s 
income because it enforces the negative indirect effect on the poor’s income. The 
other term (αp (gp’’+ gr’’)) expresses a positive second order effect from a rise in 
transfer that arises from these indirect effects. Taken together, the right hand side of 
equation (4) implies that the second order condition is met if αp < 2 gp’’ / (gp’’+ gr’’). 
This is the case if αp is substantially lower than 1 (which is confirmed by the empirical 
research reviewed above) and if the second-order indirect effects for the poor are not 
substantially smaller than the second-order indirect effects for the rich. 
  Finally, note that under maximin only the relative preferences of the poor 
count. Whether the rich are sensitive to status or not does not affect the optimal 
transfer.  
 
3.2.  Utilitarianism  
 
The maximin principle is often criticized for not allowing a major improvement in the 
benefits of richer  groups if it reduces the benefits of the worst off groups. The 
maximin principle and Rawls’ difference principle that is based upon it, allows the 
smallest benefit to the smallest number of worst off to trump any benefit, however 
large, to any but the worst off (Parfit, 1998; Crisp, 2003). Similarly, the maximin 
decision rule does not allow trade-offs between the low, medium and high income   8 
groups. Therefore, it accepts institutional changes that benefit the high income groups 
at the expense of medium income groups, as long as the lowest income group benefits 
as well. 
  Because of this criticism, we also consider another opposite extreme decision 
rule, namely that of utilitarianism that requires maximizing total utility with equal 
weights for the rich and the poor.
8
 
 The first order condition for maximal utility then 
gives: 








(6)   s = v’(Np
  – αp N) / v’(Nr – αr N) > 1.  
 
The left side of equation (5a) expresses the positive utility effects of the transfer for 
the poor (with the four elements of equation (3a) discussed above). The right side 
shows the negative utility effect of the transfer to the rich with similar elements that 
we discussed above for the poor: The first term (1 + gr’) expresses the decline in the 
utility of the rich because of the transfer to be paid by them and the negative indirect 
effects on their income. The second term (1 – 0.5αr) shows that the impact of the 
direct  and indirect income effects  of the rich  is  eroded  by relative preferences, 
because the reference level of income depends partly on their own income. The last 
term (1 – gp’) 0.5 αr shows that status effects increase the negative impact of the 
transfer on the utility of the rich by lowering their relative position, since the income 
of the poor improves. 
  Taking the total differential of equation (5b) gives: 
 
(7)  {2 (s gp’’ + gr’’) – (s αp + αr) (gp’’+ gr’’) – 2 A(∂s/∂T)} ∆T =  
   
{s(gp’ + gr’) + 2 A(∂s/∂ αp)} ∆ αp+{(gp’ + gr’) + 2 A(∂s/∂αr)} ∆ αr 
 
With A = {(1–gp’)  + 0.5αp (gp’+gr’)} 
                                                 
8 Roemer (2004) views maximin and utilitiarianism as opposite poles of prioritarianism (the view that 
the ‘worse off’ should be given priority over the ‘better off’).   9 
 
Note that equation (6) implies that ∂s/∂T<0, ∂s/∂αp>0 and ∂s/∂αr<0.  
  The left hand side of equation (7) shows that the sign of the second order 
condition is again theoretically ambiguous, but compared to the maximin model, the 
probability that this condition is met is even higher, because the transfer generates an 
additional counter effect by lowering the relative marginal utility of income of the 
poor (∂s/∂T<0). 
   From the right hand side we can conclude that an increase in the status effect 
of the poor again raises the optimal transfer rate. On top of the two reasons discussed 
under the maximin rule, the total utility decision rule aids one other effect, namely 
that a higher status effect  of the poor causes their relative  marginal utility from 
income to increase (∂s/∂αp>0).  
  The influence of the status effect of the rich needs some more explanation. A 
priori I had expected that status sensitivity of rich people would reduce the optimal 
transfer, because any income reduction caused by the transfer hurts more because 
their relative income declines (∂s/∂αr<0). However, equation (7) indicates also an 
opposite effect (gp’ + gr’). The explanation is that the status effect reduces the utility 
loss from the rich’s indirect decline in income as well as increases the utility gain of 
the rich due to the indirect effects on the poor’s income. The model does not allow 
any conclusion which of these effects dominates. But, just as in the maximin model, 
there is apparently a large asymmetry in the impact of status effects  on optimal 
income distribution. What makes the optimal income distribution more egalitarian is 
whether the poor perceive relative preferences. Whether the rich are sensitive to status 
has much less an impact on optimal income distribution. This is in line with Aronsson 
and Johansson-Stenman (2008) who find that the difference between the degree of 
positionality of the low and high income group raises the optimal marginal income tax 
rate in their model. 
  Finally, it can easily be shown that these conclusions can be extended to the 
more general case of prioritarianism that gives more weight to the ‘worse off’ than to 
the ‘better off’.  
   
4  Reference to peer group incomes 
 
Although section 3 derives some new results, the model’s implication is still very 
similar to what has been previously found in literature: namely, that status effects (at 
least, for low income groups) provide an important rationale for redistribution of 
income from the rich to the poor, independently from whether the government applies 
maximin, utilitarianism or any intermediate prioritarian decision rule. 
  In this section I will argue, however, that there is one additional problem with 
this policy implication, namely that this result will only stand if relative preferences   10 
are related to the overall, average income in society. In all models in literature this 
assumption is made. In most cases, the reference level of consumption is assumed to 
be equal to average consumption (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978;  Wendner, 2003; 
Wendner and Goulder, 2008; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008), whereas 
Oswald (1983) and Wendner (10) uses a weighted average of consumption the 
weights being based on a distribution function F that reflects the distribution in 
preferences or income. Only Samano (2009) uses a  more sophisticated weighting 
function that allows that agents may contribute to the consumption externality that 
society faces in a magnitude different from their population size (or preference or 
income). But he does not assume differences in the degree of positionality for 
different income groups nor analyses the special case that I will discuss below. 
  The point is that it is not very likely that people compare their income with the 
income of such a broad income group. Rather, they will focus on their neighbours or 
peer groups with which they are most acquainted and who provide a nearby point of 
reference. As argued by David Hume (1739): ‘It is not a great disproportion between 
ourselves and others which produces envy, but on the contrary, a proximity. A 
common soldier bears no envy for his general compared to what he will feel for his 
sergeant or corporal… A great disproportion cuts off the relationship, and keeps us 
from comparing ourselves with what is remote from us or diminishes the effects of the 
comparison’. Another nice example of this psychological phenomenon is given by De 
Mandeville who stated that a person who has to walk envies a person with a small 
carriage with four horses more than a person with a large carriage with six horses. 
Also Fehr and Schmidt (1999) argue that the social proximity among individuals is 
likely to influence reference groups. Also the empirical research by Lehmann (2001) 
indicates that concerns for relative positions  are particularly important when the 
income of the reference group is close to equal. What I want to show in this section, is 
that if reference levels of income are not related to overall average income, but rather 
to the incomes of the own social class, its policy implication for optimal distribution 
changes dramatically.  
   If relative preferences do not pertain to average income, but to peer group 
income, equation (1a) changes into: 
 
(8)   ui = v ((1– αi ) Ni ) 
 
Obviously, the relative preference will not influence the optimal solution if the 
government applies a maximin decision rule. This can be easily seen from the first 
order condition which now simply boils down to gp’ = 1. 
  A more or less similar result holds if the government applies utilitarianism. 
The first order condition then becomes: 
   11 
(9)  s(1–gp’) (1–αp)  = (1 + gr’) (1 – αr)  
 
with s = v’((1
  – αp) Np) / v’((1 – αr) Nr) > 1.  
 
Total differentiation of equation (9) gives: 
 
(10)  {(s (1 –  αp) gp’’ + (1 –  αr) gr’’ – B (∂s/∂T)} ∆T =  
   
  {–s (1–gp’) + B(∂s/∂αp)} ∆ αp + {(1+ gr’) +  B(∂s/∂αr)} ∆ αr 
 
With B = (1–gp’) (1–αp) and (again) ∂s/∂T<0, ∂s/∂αp>0 and ∂s/∂ αr<0 
 
The second order condition is now unambiguously positive, since all terms in the left 
hand side of equation (10) are positive. Furthermore, just as in equation (8) we find 
again that the influence of the status effect for high income groups is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, a rise in αr causes a decline in the relative marginal utility of income of 
the poor (∂s/∂αr) decreasing the optimal transfer. But, on the other hand, it also erodes 
the utility loss that the rich experience from their  decline in income, since the 
reference level of income declines as well (1+ gr’). The overall impact of a rise in  αr 
is therefore again uncertain and will be zero if the two opposite effects balance. 
  The main difference with the model in section 3 concerns the impact of the 
status effect of the poor. Whereas in the previous version of the model αp has an 
unambiguous positive impact on the optimal transfer, we find now an ambiguous 
effect that depends on two opposing influences. These effects are exactly contrary to 
the effects of αr. Because, on the one hand, a rise in αp now reduces the net utility 
gains from the transfer by proportionally raising the reference level of income (–s (1–
gp’)). The opposite effect is that it raises the relative marginal utility of income of the 
poor (∂s/∂αp). 
  Based on these effects, we can easily derive that an equal increase in the status 
effects of both groups (∆αp=∆αr) will have almost no effect on the optimal transfer. In 
the special case that αp=αr, the status effect even completely drops out of the first 
order  condition for maximal total  utility and consequently exerts  no impact 
whatsoever on the optimal transfer rate.  
  The policy implication that status effects imply  a more egalitarian society 
therefore crucially depends on how reference levels of income are modeled. This 
underlines the need for more empirical research to how preferences relate to the 
incomes of other income groups. Until now, empirical research does not give us many 
hints to discriminate between alternative specifications of the reference level.   12 
  Another observation that peer group related status effects evoke  is that 
equality resulting from redistribution may increase envy. As de Tocqueville stated in 
his ‘Democracy in America’ (1835): ‘When inequality is the general rule in society, 
the greatest inequalities attract no attention. But when everything is more or less level, 
the slightest variation is noticed.’ Redistribution policy may thus give rise to more 
envy. Because, if people particularly envy those in proportionate circumstances, 
redistribution of income increases the number of people they take to be their equals 
and compare themselves to. And, therefore, the more people there will be to envy. If 
an increase in envy reduces overall welfare (for example, because envious people may 
want to sabotage innovations that benefit others (Mui, 1995)), more redistribution 
might cause a decline in utility by enforcing positional competition. 
 
5  Philosophical criticism 
 
I end this article by one other argument that casts doubt on the conclusion that income 
distribution should be more egalitarian because of the existence of status effects, as 
derived in section 3 and shown by previous research. This argument is more 
philosophical in nature. It starts with the notion that from a moral point of view one 
can doubt whether all preferences in a utility framework are legitimate. In economic 
utilitarianism it is normally assumed that individuals are sovereign and that their 
preferences cannot be criticized. However, from a moral point of view, one can 
criticize this assumption if individuals happen to have morally unacceptable 
preferences. 
  This criticism may be particularly relevant in this case, because status effects 
may be rooted in vices like envy, jealousy, grudgingness or spite. Rawls (1999) thinks 
of envy as the propensity to view with hostility the greater good of others, even 
though their being fortunate than we are does not detract from our advantages. 
Jealousy and grudgingness are reverse to envy. A person who is better off may wish 
those less fortunate than he to stay in their place. That is to say, he is jealous of his 
superior position and begrudges others the greater benefits that would put them on the 
same level with himself. A person is moved by spite if he denies others benefits that 
he does not need and cannot use himself. All these inclinations are collectively 
harmful, since the envious man is willing to deprive the persons who are better off to 
reduce the distance with himself whereas the jealous, grudging and spiteful man is 
willing to maintain the distance between himself and others. In classical virtue theory 
of Aristotle, envy is therefore considered a vice. Justice theories have, consequently, 
often abstracted from relative income preferences. For example, Rawls (1999) 
eschews this notion in the set-up of the decision strategy of self-interested and rational 
contract partners in the original position, on which he bases his principles of justice. 
Instead, he takes a rather individualistic starting point by postulating that contract 
partners in the original position are mutually disinterested. According to Rawls, the   13 
postulate of mutual disinterest is necessary to ensure that the principles of justice 
avoid any controversial ethical elements. Relative income preferences caused by 
envy, jealousy, grudgingness or spite  may be such a controversial element.
9 
According to Rawls, a rational individual is not envious, at least if the differences 
between himself and others are not thought to be the result of injustice. Envy will 
arise mainly if people lack a sure confidence in their own value. Merely comparing 
how much income and wealth one has compared to what others have is a distraction. 
To become preoccupied with such economic comparisons is to become alienated from 
an orientation toward what really matters for the success of one’s life. 
10
   On the other hand, one can also argue that relative income preferences need 
not necessarily or always be disqualified as envy. They can also be interpreted as a 
natural social psychological phenomenon that people compare their condition with 
that of a reference group. People are social beings who learn from each other by social 
interaction, including comparing their relative incomes or consumption patterns. We 
cannot appreciate what we have in isolation. The unencumbered individual is in 
reality in large measure a product of a cultural environment that has formed his 
desires and needs. Knight (1923) already argued that what is desired is largely a 
matter of human relations rather than goods and services as such; we want things 
because other people have them, or cannot have them, as the case may be. Arneson 
(2007) argues that, even if one does not accept the claim that equality is intrinsically 
just and if one views justice as demanding only the elimination of poverty and no 
further redistribution, one should notice that positional goods competition implies that 
poverty includes a relative poverty component. Hence, justice pertains also to relative 
income in the sense of people having a level of income that is not too far below the 
average for their society. 
 
 
6  Conclusions 
   
This article has researched the implications of status effects on income distribution. 
Empirical research has  shown  that individuals are not only concerned about their 
absolute income, but also partly about their relative income. Optimal tax literature has 
shown that the negative externality caused by this status effect implies that income 
redistribution is efficient. 
  In this paper I qualify this conclusion in three ways. First, I show that this 
income policy implication mainly depends on whether low income groups exhibit 
                                                 
9 Crisp (2003) and Nozick (1974) even believe that all appeals to relative fairness have their ultimate 
source in envy. Brennan (1973) shows that envy can motivate non-altruistic individuals to support 
redistribution programs. 
10 Only if society permits such large disparities in income that poor people cannot help but feel a loss of 
self-esteem, Rawls judges that envy is excusable, because self-respect is one of the main primary goods 
that any rational person values. Hence, developing envious feelings if one suffers a loss in self-respect 
due to extreme income inequality is not irrational.   14 
status effects. Whether rich income groups are sensitive to status is likely to have a 
much less important impact on the optimal level of redistribution. This finding is 
independent from the type of decision rule that the government applies (maximin 
decision rule, utilitarianism or an intermediate prioritarian decision rule).  
  Second, I find that the specification of the reference group with whom people 
compare their income is decisive. If status effects only pertain to peer groups with 
similar income levels, redistributing income from rich to poor persons is not efficient 
and the economic  rationale for an egalitarian income policy vanishes.  Again, this 
finding is robust for the type of decision rule of the government.  
  A  third  argument that casts doubt on the legitimacy of egalitarian income 
policy based on status effects is that this effect may be rooted in feelings of envy, 
jealousy, grudgingness or spite. In moral theory, these feeling are normally considered 
a vice and therefore provide no morally legitimate basis for redistribution policy. 
However, status effects do not necessarily only exist because of envy or related vices. 
One can also interpret status effects as a normal expression of the social nature of 
mankind in the sense that people can only value things in relation to the valuation and 
situation of others. In that case, status effects do provide a legitimate basis for 
redistribution. 
  These theoretical findings set a new agenda for empirical research to status 
effects. In particular, in order to ascertain its income policy implications, we should 
obtain more insight into the empirical relevance of status effects among poor people, 
the exact reference group to which they compare their incomes and what the 
underlying motive is why they  compare their incomes with those of others.  The 
current empirical evidence does not discriminate among these alternatives. As long as 
as this is the case, the probability that the egalitarian implication of status effects can  
be maintained seems rather small. Because this will only be the case if empirical 
research confirms three conditions: the poor are sensitive to status effects; their 
reference levels of income relate to the income of higher income groups and not only 
to peer group income levels; these status effects are not motivated by envy, but derive 
from more morally neutral social interaction processes. If only one of these three 
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